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Diana C. Dutton *
HIS article reviews developments in Texas environmental law during
the period from October 1, 1989, to October 1, 1990. The article is
divided into two parts: Part one discusses judicial developments with
particular emphasis on the Texas Clean Air Act,' the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act,2 and the Texas Water Quality Control Act.3 Part one further
examines significant pending litigation that may affect the assessment of ad-
ministrative penalties by environmental regulatory agencies. Part two out-
lines the major amendments to the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act which
were codified in the Health and Safety Code during the review period.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Permit Holders Not Immune From Common Law Actions of Nuisance
or Trespass
A recent appellate court case considered the issue of whether permit hold-
ers are immune from common law nuisance or trespass actions with regard
to environmental claims.4 The court ruled that permit status afforded no
special protection from common law actions of nuisance or trespass.5 In
Manchester Terminal Corp. an owner of a marine terminal storage facility,
Manchester Terminal Corporation (Manchester), sued the owners and oper-
ators of a petroleum coke refinery for $12.5 million in damages resulting
from the emission of large amounts of petroleum coke dust which settled on
Manchester's property. Manchester also sought a permanent injunction to
prevent further transportation and storage of petroleum coke at the refinery.
Manchester characterized the intruding coke dust as a trespass and a nui-
sance. The refinery operators and owners, Texas Tx Tx Marine Transporta-
tion, Inc. (Texas Marine) and Lyondell Petrochemical Company (Lyondell),
filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that since the Texas Air Control
* B.S. Georgetown University, J.D. University of Texas School of Law. Partner, Akin,
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. The author gratefully acknowledges the significant contribu-
tions made to this article by Allison K. Obermann, Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
and Mr. Simon Whiting.
1. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 382.001-.115 (Vernon 1990).
2. Id. at §§ 361.001-.345.
3. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.359 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990).
4. Manchester Terminal Corp. v. Texas Tx Tx Marine Transportation, Inc., 781 S.W.2d
646 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
5. Id. at 650.
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Board (TACB) had authorized and permitted the storage of petroleum coke,
TACB had exclusive jurisdiction to conduct administrative hearings on mat-
ters concerning the petroleum coke, even the adjudication of a third party's
claim of a trespass or nuisance. Texas Marine and Lyondell also filed a plea
in abatement alleging that since Manchester had failed to exhaust its admin-
istrative remedies, the suit should be abated. The trial court granted the plea
of abatement and, finding no subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed
Manchester's cause of action.6 The court of appeals reversed and clarified
the jurisdiction of administrative bodies. 7 The court defined the primary
jurisdiction doctrine as standing for the proposition that courts should not
address issues within an administrative agency's delegated powers until the
agency has had an opportunity to consider and remedy the situation.8 How-
ever, the court held that "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
apply when the issues are 'inherently judicial,' unless the legislature has ex-
plicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body." 9 Apply-
ing this standard, the court held that trespass and nuisance actions were
inherently judicial in nature. 10 Furthermore, the court noted that the Texas
Clean Air Act (TCAA) does not give the TACB exclusive jurisdiction over
actions for injunctive relief or for damages caused by air pollution. I To the
contrary, section 382.004 of the TCAA specifically reserves a party's right to
bring private common law actions.' 2 Section 382.004 states that "[tlhis
chapter does not affect the right of a private person to pursue a common law
remedy available to abate or recover damages for a condition of pollution or
other nuisance, or for both abatement and recovery of damages." 13
The court held that even though the TCAA gives the TACB exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits and decide emission levels, it does not give the
TACB power to authorize activities that would constitute trespass and nui-
sance to another's property under the common law. 14 Thus, the court dis-
tinguished State v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp.,' s in which the trial
court modified a TACB permit, from Manchester. In Associated Metals the
Texas Supreme Court found that the trial court lacked authority to modify a
permit because the TACB had the exclusive authority to grant permits and
to set emission levels. 16 In the present case, however, Manchester sought
common law remedies. The court pointed out that the issues involved in the
present case were not issues that required the TACB's administrative exper-
tise.17 Since Manchester sought only judicial remedies based on common
6. Id. at 648.
7. Id. at 649.
8. Manchester, 781 S.W.2d at 649.
9. Id. (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 650.
11. Id.
12. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.004 (Vernon 1990).
13. Id.
14. Manchester, 781 S.W.2d at 650, (citing Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 22
Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1971)).
15. 635 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1982).




law actions of trespass and nuisance, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was
held inapplicable cable, meaning Manchester did not have to exhaust, or
even pursue, its administrative remedies before asserting its common law
claims.18
B. No Exemplary Damages in Inverse Condemnation Cases
Another case considered the issue of exemplary damages against a city
resulting from a nuisance or trespass perpetrated by the city. In City of
Odessa v,. Bell 19 the court recognized the right of an individual to pursue a
common law remedy to abate or recover damages resulting from pollution or
nuisance. Similar to TCAA section 382.004,20 the Texas Water Quality
Control Act section 26.133 specifically reserves the right of an individual to
pursue common law remedies to abate or recover damages caused by pollu-
tion or nuisance.21 However, the court held "that as a matter of law, a prop-
erty owner is not entitled to recover exemplary damages in an inverse
condemnation case brought.., for the taking or damaging of property for
public use." 22 In City of Odessa the Bells brought an inverse condemnation
action against the City of Odessa for damages resulting from a flood of sew-
age water onto the Bells' property. The Bells sued for damages under article
1, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, which states that a city must provide
compensation for property it takes or destroys.23 The trial court awarded
actual and exemplary damages and the city appealed.
The El Paso Court of Appeals first analyzed the city's liability under the
Texas Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), despite the fact that the Bells had
not brought suit under this statute.24 Under the Tort Claims Act, a city can
be held liable for negligently performing its governmental functions, but is
exempt from exemplary damages for such negligence. 25 Traditionally, a
government is not liable for negligence in the performance of proprietary
functions. However, in City of Odessa the court noted that a new amend-
ment to the Tort Claims Act26 characterizes most city activities as "govern-
mental," while designating only a few as "proprietary." The court
interpreted this revision to mean that the Tort Claims Act is applicable to all
tort actions brought against a municipality.27 The court further concluded
that in negligence actions brought under the Tort Claims Act a city cannot
be held liable for exemplary damages regardless of whether the function was
governmental or proprietary. 28
The court then analyzed the city's liability under article 1, section 17 of
18. Id. at 651.
19. 787 S.W.2d 525 (rex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
20. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.004 (Vernon 1990).
21. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.133 (Vernon 1988).
22. Odessa, 787 S.W.2d at 529.
23. TEx CONST. art. I, § 17.
24. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1990).
25. Id. § 101.024.
26. Id. § 101.0215(a).
27. Odessa, 787 S.W.2d at 527.
28. Id. at 527-28.
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the Texas Constitution, which reads, in part, that "no person's property
shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without
adequate compensation." 29 The court held that "[t]he term 'adequate com-
pensation' did not encompass exemplary damages since such damages are
punitive in nature and have nothing to do with compensating a party for his
losses." '30
The City of Odessa court distinguished San Antonio River Authority v. Jar-
ret Bros.31 and Ostrom v. City of San Antonio,32 which suggested that exem-
plary damages might be available in cases where the city ratified or
concurred in the action giving rise to complaint. 33 The court held that the
present case was not exceptional and that there was no showing of the city's
malicious conduct or evil intent to damage the Bells' land.34
The court went on to add that it could not imagine a case where "the facts
would be sufficiently egregious to support an award of exemplary damages,
in addition to adequate compensation, for damage to property done by a city
within the concept of public use." 35 The court left the possibility of exem-
plary damages in an inverse condemnation case up to constitutional
amendment. 36
C. Open Meetings Act
The Texas Supreme Court recently reconciled the Texas Open Meetings
Act 37 (TOMA) with section 17 of the Texas Administrative Procedure and
Texas Register Act (APTRA).38 TOMA requires that each meeting of every
government body be open to the public, while section 17 of APTRA allows
private communications between agency members.
In Acker v. Texas Water Commission 39 Charles Acker had been given a
29. Tex. Const. art. I, § 17.
30. Odessa, 787 S.W.2d at 528.
31. 528 S.W.2d 266 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. 77 S.W. 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1903, writ ref'd).
33. Odessa, 787 S.W.2d at 528.
34. Id. Interestingly, the court found no evidence of malicious conduct even though the
director of the Odessa Utilities Administration testified that he thought it was all right for
effluent to overflow a draw and flood private land during heavy rain, despite the fact that the
Texas Water Commission (TWC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) require
the city to obtain an easement before using private property. Furthermore, the court found no
evil intent even though the city's environmental control manager was unaware of the permit
restrictions and the fact that the Bells had complained about the flooding as early as 1977.
Additionally, despite evidence that the environmental manager had acknowledged the flooding
problem but had told a neighbor that the city would continue discharging water into the draw
because the city could not do anything about it in the near future the court found no evil
intent. Id. at 528-29. The court stated that the burden of proof was on the Bells to prove that
evil and malicious intent was imputed to the mayor and city council. Id. at 529. Thus, it
would be necessary for the Bells to show that the mayor and city council concurred in or
ratified the malicious acts of its departmental officials. Id. The court found that there was no
such proof in the present case. Id.
35. Odessa, 787 S.W.2d. at 529.
36. Id.
37. TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
38. Id. art. 6252-13a.
39. 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990).
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favorable recommendation for a permit for a waste treatment plant by a
hearings examiner at the Texas Water Commission (IWC). However, dur-
ing a recess of a TWC hearing conducted by a three member commission
considering the recommendation, two of the commissioners were allegedly
overheard conversing about Acker's application in a restroom. The conver-
sation purportedly concerned Acker's cost in complying with a city subdivi-
sion ordinance. When the public meeting reconvened, these two
commissioners voted to deny the application. Acker brought suit claiming a
violation of TOMA. The trial court granted a summary judgment for Acker
based upon the asserted violation.4° The court of appeals reversed, however,
on the grounds that section 17 of APTRA allows private communications
between agency members.4' The Texas Supreme Court reconciled the con-
flicting statutes and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.42
The supreme court began its discussion by elucidating the purpose of
TOMA: to assure" 'that the public has the'opportunity to be informed con-
cerning the transactions of public business.' ,,43 The court stressed the im-
portance of openness before the public in executive and legislative
decisions.44
TOMA requires that "every regular, special, or called meeting or session
of every governmental body shall be open to the public."'45 A "meeting"
includes any deliberation involving a quorum of the members of a governing
body at which they act on or discuss any public business or policy over
which they have control.46 Furthermore, any verbal exchange between a
majority of the members concerning any issue within their jurisdiction con-
stitutes a "deliberation." 47 Thus, the Texas Supreme Court held that when a
majority of a public decision making body is considering an issue, there can
be no informal discussion. If the discussion is not in compliance with
TOMA, then it is an illegal meeting, according to the court.48 The court
stated that it demands "exact and literal compliance" with TOMA.49 The
TWC has recently adopted a rule subjecting all of its proceedings to
TOMA.50
The court noted that a potential conflict arose between the provisions of
TOMA and an amendment of section 17 of APTRA, enacted subsequent to
TOMA. This amendment provides that "[a]n agency member may commu-
40. Id. at 300.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Acts 1967, ch. 271, § 7, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 597-598).
44. Acker, 790 S.W.2d at 300.
45. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
46. Id. § I(a), (d).
47. Id. § 1(b).
48. Acker, 790 S.W.2d at 300.
49. Id.
50. Tex. Water Comm'n, 13 Tex. Reg. 276 (1988) (adopted 13 Tex. Reg. 3579 (1988)(codified at 31 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 261.4).
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nicate ex parte with other members of the agency." 5' The court noted that
the court of appeals created a "gaping hole" by interpreting that section of
APTRA to authorize a quorum of a state commission to meet privately to
discuss a pending proceeding.52 Instead of interpreting section 17 of AP-
TRA as impliedly repealing TOMA, the Texas Supreme Court said that
such new laws should be "harmonized" with the existing law so as to give
effect to both.53 Following its own instructions, the court held that section
17 of APTRA allows commission members to meet ex parte, but only when
less than a quorum is present.54 The court said this interpretation is in ac-
cord with APTRA and the goal of TOMA, which is "to forbid ex parte
deliberations between a majority of governmental decision-makers."'55
The court remanded the case back to the trial court to further develop the
factual evidence as to whether an improper meeting had taken place. 56 The
court indicated that upon finding an improperly closed meeting by two of
the three members of the TWC, a summary judgment for Acker should be
rendered.57
D. Annexations and the Location of Landfills
In City of Bells v. Greater Texoma Utility Authority58 the Dallas Court of
Appeals addressed issues arising out of a controversy over where to locate a
landfill. The court addressed annexation by a city and whether an outside
district could properly locate a landfill within the city's annexed boundaries.
1. Facts and Case History
In 1980, Texoma Utility (Texoma)59 was looking for a landfill location.
In early 1981, Texoma approached Ken Grantham (Grantham) and sought
permission to conduct tests on his land to determine the suitability of his
property as a landfill site. In April of that year the City of Bells (Bells)
began annexing properties adjacent to the Grantham tract. On May 26,
1981, Texoma applied for a landfill permit to be located on the Grantham
property. Approximately one year later, on May 10, 1982, Bells passed an
ordinance annexing the Grantham property. In 1984, Bells passed a solid
waste disposal site ordinance restricting disposal site size and location if lo-
cated within Bells's extraterritorial jurisdiction and city limits. Texoma and
Grantham filed suit seeking a declatory judgment. The trial court held that
51. Acker, 790 S.W.2d at 301 (citing Acts 1977, ch. 780, § 17, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1959,
1960).
52. Id. at 301.
53. Id.
54. Acker, 790 S.W.2d at 301. This interpretation would forbid a three person commis-
sion, such as the TWC, from meeting ex parte, since any meeting of more than one commis-
sioner would constitute a majority. Id. at 301 n.3.
55. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
56. Acker, 790 S.W.2d at 302.
57. Id.
58. 790 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
59. Texoma Utility is a public agency formed to provide water, sewer, and waste disposal
services to member cities.
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the ordinance restricting disposal sites was not enforceable against Tex-
oma.6° The trial court also held that Bells's ordinance annexing Grantham's
property was invalid and, thus, Grantham's property was not within the
Bells city limit.6 1 Bells appealed these rulings.
2. Validity of the Annexations
The appeals court noted that it was undisputed that Bells had failed to
comply with statutory regulations governing annexations. 62 For example,
Bells failed to comply with the notice provision requiring notices to be pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation. 63 The court then went on to
consider whether such annexations were validated notwithstanding Bells's
noncompliance with the annexation statutes.6 The court explained the role
of validating statutes, which are periodically enacted by the Texas legisla-
ture, as validating the boundary lines of certain cities, including subsequent
annexations.6" Specifically, the court addressed former article 974d-34 of
the Texas Revised Civil Statutes,66 which expressly provided that attempted
annexations "'may not be held invalid because they were not performed in
accordance with law.' "67 The court stated that the clear intent of article
974d-34 was to validate governmental acts and proceedings of cities pertain-
ing to annexations or attempted annexations. Accordingly, the court held
that Bells's attempted annexation of the Grantham tract must be upheld.68
The court interpreted article 974d-34 to validate any annexation, even if the
annexation is noncontiguous or beyond the limits of a city's extraterritorial
jurisdiction.69 Drawing conclusions from express language in a similar vali-
dating statute, article 974d-28,70 which provides that "boundaries ... are
validated in all respects, even though the.., extension of [the boundaries]
was not in accordance with law," the court held that the Bells annexation
was valid even though Bells did not comply with the law in performing the
annexation. 71
With respect to the annexation of the Grantham tract, the court found
that there was factual evidence that Grantham had petitioned Bells for an-
nexation.72 Additionally, the court found article 974d-34 validated the an-
nexation of the Grantham tract, regardless of any procedural
60. City of Bells, 790 S.W.2d at 8.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id.
64. City of Bells, 790 S.W.2d at 13.
65. Id.
66. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 848, § 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4815, repealed by Act of August
31, 1987, ch. 149, § 49, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 707, 1306. Section 50(a) of the repealing legisla-
tion makes clear that the repeal of former article 974d-34 is executed law and does not affect
the validations that occurred under that law.
67. City of Bells, 790 S.W.2d at 14.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 15.
70. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 974d-28, repealed by Acts 1987, ch. 149, § 49(l)(1987).
71. City of Bells, 790 S.W.2d at 15 (emphasis omitted).




3. Validity of the Ordinances Restricting the Size and Location of
Landfills
Notwithstanding its finding that the annexation was valid, the court noted
that Bells did not comply with statutory notice provisions when it adopted
the ordinance restricting the location of landfills. Bells was required to pub-
lish the proposed ordinance in a newspaper of general circulation for two
weeks prior to adoption. The court held, therefore, that Bells's failure to
provide notice invalidated the ordinance, which, thus, could not be used to
prohibit Texoma from locating a landfill on the Grantham property. 74
4. Texoma Has No Authority to Locate its Landfill Within Nonmember
City's Boundaries
At the heart of this lengthy case is the issue of whether a conservation and
reclamation district can invade a nonmember city and locate a landfill there
against that city's wishes. Texoma is a public agency of the state, created by
the legislature through the "District Act'" 75 to provide services to member
cities. Bells is not a member city of Texoma. The court noted that in its
creation, Texoma was given the authority to operate landfills within or with-
out its district boundaries. 76 However, the court stated that neither the Dis-
trict Act nor the Texas Water Code grant Texoma the power to invade the
boundaries of a nonmember city and locate a landfill on that site. The court
explained that "authority to locate an activity outside of one's jurisdiction is
not unlimited authority to locate the activity inside someone else's jurisdic-
tion."' 77 The court strengthened its argument by negative implication, not-
ing that the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA) sets forth the
conditions under which a municipality may not restrict the operation of a
solid waste facility. 78 In order to be immune from municipal restrictions
limiting the operation of a facility, "the facility must have been in existence
at the time the municipality was incorporated or at the time the land on
which the facility sits was annexed, and the facility must be operating in
substantial compliance with the applicable regulations."'79 The court held
that in the present case neither of the conditions had been met and thus Bells
could restrict the operation of a solid waste facility.80
5. City of Bells Holdings
The court reversed the trial court, holding first that the Grantham tract
73. Id.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Act of May 2, 1979, ch. 97, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 177, amended by Act of June 17,
1983, ch. 398, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2160.
76. City of Bells, 790 S.W.2d at 18.
77. Id.
78. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.166 (Vernon 1990).




was annexed into Bells regardless of procedural violations and by virtue of
validating statutes that were in effect at the time of the annexation. Second,
the court found that Bells had the authority to prevent Texoma from placing
a landfill within Bells despite the invalidity of the ordinance involved. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that although the legislature granted Texoma the
right to purchase land outside the geographical boundaries of its district, the
legislature did not grant Texoma unilateral authority to place a landfill
within the city limits of a nonmember city.
E. One-Stop Permitting and Finality of Administrative Orders
In People Against Contaminated Environment v. Envirosafe Services of
Texas, Inc. 81 Envirosafe Services of Texas (Envirosafe) applied for permits
from the TWC and the TACB for the construction of a hazardous waste
management facility. After a hearing, TACB denied Envirosafe's applica-
tion. The order provided, however, that Envirosafe would be permitted to
reopen its case before TACB within 180 days to present evidence addressing
TACB's objections to the permit. People Against Contaminated Environ-
ment (PACE) intervened and appealed this provision of the order to the
district court. The district court dismissed the appeal because the adminis-
trative order was not final. 82 The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed in Peo-
ple Against Contaminated Environment v. Texas Air Control Board.83
Within the 180-day period, Envirosafe filed a response and requested that
the hearing be reopened. While waiting for its second hearing at TACB,
Envirosafe determined that the facility design would require modifications to
comply with numerous statutory and regulatory changes that had occurred
during the interim. Envirosafe sought technical consultation with TWC and
made a series of revisions with respect to the applications pending before
both agencies.
1. One Stop Permitting
The TWC suspended its processing of the application because it was un-
sure whether the matter could proceed under the one-stop permitting provi-
sions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA).8 4 The TWC further
refused Envirosafe's request that the matter be addressed in an open meeting
and sought an Attorney General's opinion concerning the jurisdiction of the
respective agencies to entertain the proceeding. Envirosafe then brought the
present suit seeking a declaratory judgment that one-stop permitting applied
to its facility. The district court held that one-stop permitting was not avail-
able since evidentiary hearings had already begun on the application at
81. 797 S.W.2d 138 ('ex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
82. Id. at 139.
83. 725 S.W.2d 810 (rex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.061.-.112 (Vernon 1990). These provi-
sions allow the permit applicant to obtain only one permit for a hazardous waste management
facility with the TWC as the "lead" agency, even though TACB requirements may be included




2. Finality of Administrative Orders
PACE again requested a declaratory judgment that the TACB order de-
nying Envirosafe's application was now a final order. The district court de-
clared that the TACB order was not a final administrative order. PACE
again appealed.
The Austin Court of Appeals referred to its earlier decision in TACB, 86
wherein it first addressed this issue.8 7 In this first opinion, the court ruled
that the TACB order was not final because the case could be reopened
within 180 days.88 The court stated that a final administrative order is one
that leaves nothing open for future disposition.89 Following its earlier deci-
sion, the court denied PACE's appeal and held that "[s]o long as matters
remain open, unfinished or inconclusive, there is no final order." 90
The court refuted PACE's argument that the TACB order was a "contin-
gent order" that becomes final upon the happening of another event. The
court noted that the TACB order did not identify an event that would cause
the order to become final. Rather, the order itself provided that upon En-
virosafe's additional proof, the matter would be reopened. The court noted
that Envirosafe had filed additional proof and modifications and had re-
quested that the matter be reopened. As the TACB had not yet made a
disposition of Envirosafe's modified application, the court held that the or-
der was not yet final. 91
F. Challenges to Landfill Permits
In City of Missouri City v. Texas Department of Health 92 the Texas De-
partment of Health (TDH) granted Browning-Ferris, Inc. (BFI) a permit to
construct and operate a solid waste landfill. The City of Missouri City,
Texas (Missouri City) challenged the issuance of the permit in Travis
County District Court. The district court affirmed the decision of TDH.
Missouri City then appealed the lower court decision, asserting a number of
objections to the issuance of the permit that the Austin Court of Appeals
considered and rejected in turn.
1. Standard of Review
Initially the court determined the standard of review for TDH's decision
to issue a solid waste landfill permit. The court stated that the permit was
governed by TSWDA and, thus, "the issue on appeal 'is whether the action
85. Envirosafe, 797 S.W.2d at 140.
86. TACB, 725 S.W.2d 810.
87. Envirosafe, 797 S.W.2d at 140.
88. TACB, 725 S.W.2d at 811.
89. Envirosafe, 797 S.W.2d at 140.
90. Id. (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Air Prod. & Chem, Inc, 594 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.c.)).
91. Envirosafe, 797 S.W.2d at 140.
92. No. 388-264-CV (Tex. App.-Austin 1990).
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is invalid, arbitrary or unreasonable.' ,,93 Therefore, the court argued, the
scope of judicial review of TDH's issuance of the landfill permit is governed
by the substantial evidence rule.94 "Substantial evidence" is defined to be
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." 9 The court noted, however, that an agency decision
may be supported by substantial evidence and still be held invalid due to
arbitrariness. Such arbitrariness is found when the treatment accorded par-
ties in the administrative process denies them due process of law.96
2. Evidence of Financial Responsibility
Missouri City contended that the record contained insufficient evidence of
financial responsibility as required by TSWDA. 97 Section 361.085(c) of-
TSWDA requires that an applicant submit evidence of financial responsibil-
ity as assurance that the applicant has the ability to properly operate the site
or provide proper closure. The TDH rule provides that evidence of financial
responsibility "may be in the form of performance bonds, letters of credit
from recognized financial institutions, [or] company stockholder reports."98
BFI submitted, among other items, annual reports of its parent corpora-
tion and the parent corporation's assurance that it would provide full finan-
cial support for the facility if necessary. Missouri City contended that the
evidence relating to the corporate parent was irrelevant to BFI's financial
responsibility because of the difficulty of piercing the corporate veil to hold
the parent company liable.
The court ruled that the TDH regulation did not require one particular
kind of proof of financial responsibility. 99 Moreover, the court found that
the parent corporation's financial condition was not the only evidence sub-
mitted and, thus, the record contained substantial evidence upon which a
reasonable person could have concluded that BFI provided sufficient assur-
ances of its financial responsibility.1 °
3. Landfill Liner Design
Missouri City next attacked the approved landfill bottom liner design.
Missouri City argued that TDH approved the liner without substantial evi-
dence supporting the sufficiency of the proposed design. The court, how-
ever, deferred to TDH conclusions that the liner was designed in compliance
with applicable laws and regulations. The court stated that "[w]hen the con-
93. City of Missouri City v. Texas Dep't of Health, No. 388-264-CV at 3 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1990) (citing TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321(e) (Vernon 1990)).
94. Missouri City, No. 388-264-CV at 3.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 4.
97. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.085(c) (Vernon 1990).
98. 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 325.74(b)(6)M) (1989).
99. Missouri City, No. 388-264-CV at 5.
100. The court noted that BFI had also submitted evidence of ownership of heavy equip-
ment costing in excess of $8 million, evidence that BFI currently owned and operated six
landfills in Texas, "and evidence asserting that BFI offer(ed] the citizens of Texas historical
competence with regard to solid waste landfill management in Texas." Id. at 5.
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struction of an agency rule is in issue, we accord deference to the agency's
construction."' 10 1 Finding the TDH rule governing liners to be reasonable,
the court accepted TDH's expertise in the construction of its rule. Addition-
ally, the court found that the sufficiency of the liner design was supported by
substantial evidence in the record.10 2 BFI provided an extensive amount of
evidence to support its liner, including geotechnical reports, a Soil Liner
Quality Control Plan, a Soil Management Plan, and a Concept of Operation.
4. Rule Making Authority
Missouri City next argued that TDH erred in exercising its rulemaking
authority. At issue is a TDH rule that states:
The primary concern of the department is that the use of any land for a
municipal solid waste site does not adversely impact on public health.
However, the impact of the site upon a city... will be considered in
terms of compatibility of land use, zoning in the vicinity, community
growth patterns, and other factors associated with the public interest.10 3
Missouri City alleged that the regulation did not comply with the mandate
of TSWDA, which states that "[i]t is this state's policy and the purpose of
this [act] to safeguard the health, welfare, and physical property of the peo-
ple."104 Missouri City argued that the TDH regulation had relegated site
impact on property owners, and land use, to a role secondary to public
health considerations. The court agreed with Missouri City's contention,
but ruled that TDH did not abuse its discretion in adopting section
325.74(b)(5)(A). 05 The court held that TSWDA did not prescribe the
weight an agency must give to the criteria it set forth or the priority in which
they must be considered.10 6 Furthermore, the court held that Missouri City
had failed to prove that section 325.74(b)(5)(A) of the agency rules was in-
consistent with the TSWDA.10 7
5. Land Use
Missouri City contested TDH's decision about future and current land
use. However, the court held that the agency had provided ample evidence
such that reasonable minds could have reached findings of fact that justified
TDH's decision.108 Such evidence included a Land Use and Analysis Re-
port that showed significant preexisting development (oil production and
chemical manufacturing facilities) that made the area incompatible with fu-
ture residential development."' 9 Missouri City tried to argue that the land-
fill would have a discriminatory racial effect that would accelerate
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 7.
103. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 325.74(b)(5)(A) (1989) (emphasis added).
104. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.002 (Vernon 1990).
105. Missouri City, No. 388-264-CV at 9.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Missouri City, No. 388-264-CV at 10 n.4.
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segregation of subdivisions near the site because blacks are less able to move
than whites. The court rejected this argument because Missouri City failed
to cite any legal authority that suggested that a landfill permit should not be
granted on the basis of negative racial effects.110
6. Traffic Impact
Missouri City contested TDH's findings with regard to traffic impacts.
Specifically, it alleged that the daily trash hauling truck estimate was pure
conjecture and that the agency's decision with respect to traffic impacts ig-
nored the estimated additional 220 trucks that would haul away excavated
dirt. Furthermore, the city asserted that TDH failed to comply with its reg-
ulation that requires consultation with the State Department of Highways.
The court reviewed the rules in chapter twenty-five of the Texas Administra-
tive Code, sections 325.74(b)(5)(A)(i) and 325.74(b)(5)(B), and the findings
of fact of the agency. I I1 The court accepted the agency conclusion that ex-
pected traffic increases due to the landfill were acceptable even including
Missouri City's estimates.112 Furthermore, the court concluded that there
was ample evidence in the record to support the agency's decision with re-
spect to the projected traffic impact. Finally, the court noted that TDH had
consulted with the Texas Highway Department whose recommendations
were not binding on the TDH anyway. 13
7 Participation of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management
Finally, Missouri City alleged that the party status of the Bureau of Solid
Waste Management (BSWM) denied the city due process of law because
BSWM "'became an active advocate on behalf of the applicant.' "114 The
court struck down this argument, stating that the city had not explained
how BSWM's participation had prejudiced the applicant and how the city
had been denied due process. The court concluded that the admission of
BSWM as a party to the agency proceeding to defend its own technical re-
view during the hearing process did not violate constitutionally protected
due process. 1 5
Finding no error in any of the city's contentions, the court affirmed the
district court and the granting of a permit to BFI for the construction of the
landfill. This case illustrates typical challenges to a permit and how they
may be treated by a court.
G. Constitutional Challenge to the Assessment of Administrative Penalties
On direct appeal, currently awaiting a decision by the Texas Supreme
Court, is a case that challenges the constitutionality of administrative penal-
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 11-12 (citing 25 TEx. ADMiN. CODE § 325.74(b)(5)(A)(i), (b)(5)(B) (1989)).
112. Id. at 12.
113. Missouri City, No. 388-264-CV at 13.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 14.
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ties. In Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board116 the
Texas Association of Business (TAB) sought a declaratory judgment that
certain sections of the TCAA, Texas Water Code, and TSWDA that provide
for the assessment of administrative penalties117 violated the Texas Constitu-
tion and, thus, were invalid and unlawful. In addition, TAB requested a
permanent injunction against the enforcement of the contested statutes and
rules. The district court denied relief and held, without explaining its rea-
sons, that the challenged statutes and regulations were constitutional.' 18
TAB has appealed directly to the Texas Supreme Court contesting the con-
stitutionality of the penalty provisions.
In its brief, TAB contends that the statutes empowering TWC and TACB
"to assess administrative penalties violate the right to jury trial guaranteed
by article 1, section 15 of the Texas Constitution, by failing to make jury
review available at any stage in the proceedings." ' 1 9 Additionally, TAB
contends that the penalty provisions "violate the 'Open Courts' provision of
the Texas Constitution, article I, section 13, by creating impermissible finan-
cial barriers to judicial review."' 120
TAB's brief points out that up until 1985, the assessment of civil penalties
for violations of TCAA, TSWDA, and Water Quality Act (WQA) was made
exclusively through the district court.' 21 Those charged with violations of
the acts could obtain a jury trial for the penalty assessment proceedings. In
1985, however, the Texas Legislature made sweeping changes in the enforce-
ment schemes of TCAA, TSWDA, and WQA. The resulting amendments
gave direct enforcement power to TACB and the TWC and the authority to
assess civil penalties of up to $10,000 per day per violation.1 22 Although the
new statutory schemes give the state the option to pursue penalties in district
court, the agencies can now assess civil penalties on their own without any
allowance for a jury trial at any stage in the proceeding. TAB further notes
that the only judicial review afforded to a party contesting a penalty is a
proceeding before the Travis County District Court without a jury, "where
the penalty is evaluated under the 'substantial evidence' rule."' 23 Further-
more, a party cannot obtain any judicial review until that party has first paid
into escrow, or posted a supersedeas bond for, the full amount of the pen-
116. No. 393,120 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 24, 1989).
117. The TACB administrative penalty authority is found in the Texas Clean Air Act,
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 382.088-.089 (Vernon 1989) (formerly TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 4.041). The Texas Water Commission administrative penalty au-
thority is found in TEx. WATER CoDE §§ 26.136, 27.1015 (Vernon 1988), and the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act, TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.252 (Vernon 1989) (formerly TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7, § 8b).
118. Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., No. 393,120 at 2 (Dist. Ct. of
Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 24, 1989).
119. Brief for Texas Association of Business at 2, Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air
Control Bd., No. C-9556 (Tex. filed Feb. 21, 1990) [hereinafter TAB Brief).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 4-5.
123. TAB Brief, supra note 119, at 5.
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alty. 24 When a party fails to pay the full amount or post a bond in the full
amount, the party is expressly deemed to have waived its right to any judi-
cial review. TAB asserts that by taking away this right to a jury trial, the
legislature has violated article 1, section 15 of the Texas Constitution, which
unequivocally states that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain invio-
late."125 Furthermore, by requiring a party to pay the full amount of the
penalty beforehand, the legislature has erected formidable financial barriers
to the narrowest form of judicial review. 126 TAB asserts that these financial
barriers to judicial review constitute a violation of the Texas Constitution's
"Open Courts" provision, which guarantees all litigants the right of access to
the courts. 127
1. Right to Trial by Jury
TAB cites State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc 128 for the proposition
that "where the State seeks to recover civil penalties, the accused is entitled
to trial by jury."129 Following Credit Bureau of Laredo, TAB asserts that
the right to a trial by jury depends on whether the present action involves
rights and remedies of a sort typically enforced in an action at common law
for which ajury trial was afforded.130 Since actions for civil penalties existed
at common law, the court in Credit Bureau of Laredo held, and TAB now
asserts, that if the State seeks civil penalties, the accused is entitled to a jury
trial. TAB concludes that under Credit Bureau of Laredo, the right to a jury
trial arises where the state pursues civil penalties through the administrative
proceeding rather than a district court proceeding.13' TAB admits that not
all administrative proceedings must be afforded a jury review. For example,
certain matters that are merely administrative or ministerial in nature need
not be reviewed by a jury. 132 However, TAB asserts that if the matter being
decided by the administrative agency is one that was historically afforded a
jury trial and is one for which the state still allows jury trial, then the Texas
Constitution mandates that a jury trial be afforded. 133
The brief of the Sierra Club, an intervenor on behalf of TACB and TWC,
responds to the TAB brief by distinguishing administrative penalties from
other situations where there is a clear right to a jury trial. The Sierra Club
counters that the right to a jury trial is afforded only to those who had such
a right at the time the Texas Constitution was adopted. 134 The Sierra Club
argues that since the administrative state was not in existence when the
124. Id. at 6.
125. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 15.
126. TAB Brief, supra note 119, at 6-7.
127. Id. at 7.
128. 530 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1975).
129. TAB Brief, supra note 119, at 10.
130. Id at 9-10.
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id. at 15.
133. Id.
134. Brief for the Sierra Club at 2, Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., No.
C-9556 (Tex. filed Feb. 21, 1990) [hereinafter Sierra Club Brief].
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Texas Constitution was adopted, there is no constitutional right to a jury
trial in administrative proceedings.
The Sierra Club further asserts that affording a jury trial would undercut
the Legislature's desire to provide a quick and flexible administrative remedy
to address violations of state environmental laws. It argues that TACB and
TWC were given the power to assess penalties to increase the agencies' abil-
ity to obtain quicker compliance and provide additional deterrence to
violators. ' 35
The Sierra Club distinguishes Credit Bureau of Laredo by reasoning that
administrative penalties are not civil penalties and, therefore, Credit Bureau
of Laredo does not apply to the present case. Administrative penalties, the
Club explains, are a creature of an administrative state, while civil penalties
have to be brought in an action before a court. Since the assessment of an
administrative penalty does not require an action, it should not require a
jury trial. t36
Furthermore, the Sierra Club points out that article I, section 15 of the
Texas Constitution provides for a jury trial only if the right to such a trial
existed under common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. 137
Since administrative penalties did not exist at common law, the right to a
jury trial does not attach.
2. Financial Barriers Violate the "Open Courts" Provision
In its brief, TAB sets forth the "Open Courts" provision of the Texas
Constitution. This provision states that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and
every person for an injury done to him ... shall have remedy by due course
of law."' 138 TAB asserts that this provision guarantees all litigants the right
of access to the courts.' 39 TAB alleges that the requirement of payment in
escrow or posting of a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the penalty
prior to judicial review creates an impermissible financial barrier to judicial
review. TAB cites Dillingham v. Putnam 140 for the proposition that "a
party's right to appeal ... cannot be made to depend on his ability to give a
bond which will within itself secure... full satisfaction of his judgment."' 14 1
The Sierra Club responds to TAB's argument by stating that the "Open
Courts" provision protects the right of access to the courts only for common
law causes of action.' 42 The Sierra Club raises Stanfield v. Texas Depart-
ment of Public Safety, 14 3 wherein the court held that the right to appeal an
administrative order does not exist unless specifically granted by statute. 44
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id. at 13.
137. Id. at 14.
138. TAB Brief, supra note 119, at 16 (citing TEx. CONsT. Art. I, § 13).
139. Id. at 17.
140. 109 Tex. 1, 14 S.W. 303 (1890).
141. TAB Brief, supra note 119, at 18 (citing Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1, 14 S.W.
303,304 (1890)).
142. Sierra Club Brief, supra note 134, at 16.
143. 422 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. Sierra Club Brief, supra note 134, at 16.
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Furthermore, the Sierra Club asserts that the escrow and supersedeas
bond mechanisms created to secure the payment of a penalty are reasonable
and protect against a violator using the judicial review process in an attempt
to delay payment through a meritless appeal.1 45 The Sierra Club warns that
if the Texas Supreme Court grants a right to a jury trial in administrative
penalty proceedings, eventually the court will have to extend such a right to
administrative permit proceedings.
This case stands to test the constitutionality of the 1985 amendments
granting TACB and TWC the power to assess penalties. It will mark the
first time the Texas Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of the
administrative scheme enacted in 1985.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During its sixth session, the 71st Legislature amended the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act and the Texas Comprehensive Municipal Solid Waste
Management, Resource Recovery and Conservation Act. 1" The amend-
ments were first enacted in 1989 in the regular session of the 71st Legisla-
ture, finally codified in the Health & Safety Code, and effective on September
6, 1990. Although the amendements were not officially part of the Health
and Safety Code, they had previously been given effect. Set forth below are
the major amendments, first adopted in 1989 and made effective during the
review period.
A. Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act
1. Sections 361.002 and 361.0231: Policy Statements
The Texas Legislature amended section 361.002 to include a provision on
the state's policy regarding the storage, processing, and disposal of hazard-
ous waste. Section 361.002(b) states that "it is in the public interest to re-
quire hazardous waste to be stored, processed, and disposed of only at
permitted hazardous industrial solid waste facilities."1 47 Likewise, section
361.0231 was added to provide that it is state policy to provide adequate
capacity for industrial and hazardous waste generated in Texas, and to elimi-
nate, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste.148
2. Section 361.013: Solid Waste Disposal and Transportation Fees
Revised section 361.013 replaces the former section entitled "Facility
Fee." The new section provides that TDH will charge a fee for all solid
waste disposed of in Texas. 149 Transporters who are required to register
with TDH will also be charged an annual registration fee set by TDH.150
145. Id. at 17.
146. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.001-.345, 363.001-.145 (Vernon 1990).
147. Id. § 361.002(b).
148. Id. § 361.0231.
149. Id. § 361.013(a).
150. Id. § 361.013(c).
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This registration fee may not be less than $25 or more than $500.151 Finally,
the statute provides that operators of municipal solid waste facilities must
maintain records and annually report to TDH the amount of solid waste
brought through the facility.152
3. Sections 361.0151 and 361.0861: Recycling Separate Recycling Permit
Not Required
The Legislature added two new sections on recycling. Section 361.0151
provides for a waste minimization and recycling office within TDH.153 This
office will provide technical assistance to local governments concerning re-
cycling matters. 154 Additionally, TDH is directed to work with the Texas
Department of Commerce to pursue the development of markets for re-
cycled materials.' 55 Section 361.0861 states that a permit holder or solid
waste management facility that plans to recycle is not required to obtain a
separate permit for that recycling from TDH.1 56 However, such a facility
must register with TDH.1'7 Additionally, TDH is directed to expedite per-
mit proceedings if the applicant seeking the permit employs recycling
methods.' 58
4. Sections 361.0215 and 361.0216: Waste Reduction Advisory
Committee; Waste Minimization and Reduction Group
New section 361.0215 provides for an advisory committee composed of
nine members to advise TWC and the inter-agency coordination counsel.' 59
The statute directs the committee to advise on matters such as promoting
waste reduction and minimization, developing public awareness programs to
educate citizens about hazardous waste, and providing technical assistance
to local governments for development of waste management strategies and
other possible programs to help implement the state's preferred waste man-
agement technologies as set forth in section 361.023(a). 160 Section 361.0216
provides for the establishment of "a waste minimization and reduction group
to assist in developing waste minimization and reduction programs."' 16
5. Section 361.0635: Preapplication Meeting
The legislature amended this section to provide that a person who intends
to file a permit application must meet jointly with members of TDH, TWC,
and TACB to discuss the permit application. 162 The potential applicant
151. Id.
152. Id. § 361.013(d).
153. Id. § 361.0151(a).
154. Id.
155. Id. § 361.0151(b).
156. Id. § 361.0861(a).
157. Id. § 361.0861(b).
158. Id. § 361.0861(c).
159. Id. § 361.0215(a).
160. Id. § 361.0215(b).
161. Id. § 361.0216.
162. Id. § 361.0635(a).
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must request the pre-application meeting in writing from the state agency
who has jurisdiction over the permit and that agency will coordinate a meet-
ing with the other agencies. 163 This meeting must be held before the appli-
cant files the permit application. 164
6. Section 361.064: Permit Application Form and Procedures
The legislature amended section 361.064 by adding subsection (b), which
provides that state agencies that have the authority to permit a solid waste
management facility must provide a thorough and timely review of an issu-
ance or denial of any permit application. 165
7. Section 361.0665: Notice of Intent to Obtain Municipal Solid Waste
Permit
New section 361.0665 provides that applicants for a municipal solid waste
permit must publish notice of their intent t6 obtain such a permit "at least
once in a newspaper of the largest general circulation that is published in the
county in which the facility is... proposed to be located."' 66 The appli-
cant's notice must include a description of the location of the proposed facil-
ity, the statement that affected persons may request a hearing from TDH,
the manner in which TDH may be contacted for further information, and
any other information required by TDH rules. 167 If no newspaper is pub-
lished in the county, notice must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county and in a newspaper circulated in the immediate
vicinity in which the facility is proposed to be located. 168 Furthermore,
TDH will publish a notice in the Texas Register.169
8. Section 361.081: Notice of Hearing Concerning Application for
Landfill Permit
The legislature deleted subsections (a), (b), and (e) from section 361.081.
TDH is no longer required to give public notice of a hearing on an applica-
tion for a landfill permit in a newspaper of general circulation for two con-
secutive weeks. However, TDH must notify each residence, business, and
owner of real property located within three-fourths mile of the proposed
landfill by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, not less than
thirty days or more than forty-five days before the hearing. 170
The elimination of some of the notification requirements under section
361.081 most likely takes into account the addition of section 361.0665 dis-
cussed above. In effect, the changes shift the burden of notice for a munici-
pal solid waste permit from TDH to the applicant since section 361.0665
163. Id. § 361.0635(b).
164. Id. § 361.0635(c).
165. Id. § 361.064(b).
166. Id. § 361.0665(a).
167. Id. § 361.0665(b).
168. Id. § 361.0665(c).
169. Id. § 361.0665(d).
170. Id. § 361.081(a).
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now requires each applicant for a landfill permit to publish a notice of intent
to obtain a municipal solid waste permit.
9. Section 361.0885: Denial of Application; Involvement of Former
Employee
Section 361.0815 directs a state agency to deny any permit application
when it determines that a former employee of the state participated in the
agency's review and, after leaving employment with the agency, provided
assistance on the application for the permit. 171 As long as the former em-
ployee did not provide assistance, the application will not be prejudiced.' 72
A former employee is defined as anyone who was previously employed by a
state agency as a supervisory or exempt employee and whose duties during
employment with the state agency included involvement in the agency's re-
view, evaluation, or processing of applications.173
10. Section 361.111: Department may Exempt Certain Municipal
Facilities
New section 361.111 provides that TDH may exempt certain municipal
solid waste management facilities from permitting requirements if the facil-
ity transfers waste from a small service area to a processing or disposal site
and if the facility is in compliance with board of health regulations.174
11. Section 361.112: Storage, Transportation, and Disposal of Used or
Scrap Tires
The legislature added section 361.112 to provide for the disposal of used
tires. It provides that a person may not store more than 500 tires unless the
person registers the storage site with TDH. 75 A person may not dispose of
used tires in a facility that has not received a permit from TDH for that
purpose.' 76 If more than 500 tires are stored, they must be shredded, split,
or quartered unless TDH authorizes otherwise. 77 Furthermore, a person
who transports used tires must maintain records of tires disposed of or
stored.' 78
12. Section 361.138: Commercial Hazardous Waste
This section imposes a fee on commercial hazardous waste facility opera-
tors who receive hazardous waste generated off-site.' 79 This fee is in addi-
tion to any other fees. 180 The statute, however, exempts certain facilities:
171. Id. § 361.0885(a)(I)-(2).
172. Id. § 361.0885(b).
173. Id. § 361.0885(c).
174. Id. § 361.111.
175. Id. § 361.112(a).
176. Id. § 361.112(c).
177. Id. § 361.112(f).
178. Id. § 361.112(g).




facilities whose sole off-site waste is received from affiliates;""' facilities that
store waste from off-site generators for fewer than 60 days;182 and, finally,
facilities permitted under chapter 26 of the Water Code 1 3 or the Federal
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program.184 The statute
also sets forth how the collected fees shall be credited.185
13. Section 361.139: Factors to be Considered in Setting Fees
This section sets forth criteria TWC must consider when setting fees. "The
criteria include:
(1) the variation in risks to the public associated with different waste
management methods...; (2) the funding needed to support the ade-
quate regulation of industrial solid waste and hazardous waste genera-
tion ... activities...; (3) promoting the efficient and effective use of
existing hazardous waste storage ...facilities within the state; (4)
whether... waste received by a commercial facility has been or will be
assessed a... fee at other commercial facilities...; and (5) the prevail-
ing rates of similar fees... charged in other states to which wastes from
this state may be exported or from which wastes may be imported
186
14. Sections 361.181-.202: Subchapter F Registry and Cleanup of Certain
Hazardous Waste Facilitites
The legislature completely amended subchapter F. Section 361.181 now
provides that TWC will publish annually an updated state registry that iden-
tifies each facility constituting an "eminent and substantial endangerment to
public health and safety."' 8i 7 The registry also prioritizes the actions at each
listed facility.' 1
Section 361.182 allows the executive director to conduct investigations of
the facilities listed on the registry or facilities the executive director believes
should be included on the registry.' 8 9 Furthermore, the director may re-
quest information and documents from such facilities.190 Requested docu-
ments remain open to the public except upon a showing by the owner that to
do so would divulge trade secrets.' 91
Section 361.183 provides that before a facility can be listed on the state
registry, the executive director must determine whether the potential endan-
germent to public health and safety or to the environment can be resolved by
the owner or operator under the federal Resource Conservation and Recov-
181. Id. § 361.138(f).
182. Id. § 361.138(g).
183. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.407 (Vernon 1991).
184. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.138(h) (Vernon 1990).
185. Id § 361.138(k).
186. Id. § 361.151.
187. Id. § 361.181(a).
188. Id. § 361.181(b).
189. Id. § 361.182(a).
190. Id. § 361.182(b).
191. Id. § 361.182(c).
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ery Act' 92 or by any of the potentially responsible parties (PRPs) pursuant
to a TWC administrative order.1 93
Section 361.184 provides that once the executive director determines a
facility is eligible for listing on the state registry, TWC must publish notice
of its intent to list the facility in the state registry, in the Texas Register, and
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the facility is lo-
cated. 194 If the facility is eligible to be on the state registry, the executive
director must make reasonable efforts to identify all PRPs for this facility 1 95
Each PRP must be given written notification of the proposed facility listing
and the procedures for requesting a public meeting. 196
If a PRP requests a public meeting, the TWC must publish the date, time,
and location of the meeting in the Texas Register and in the same newspaper
as above. 197 This notice cannot be provided later than thirty-one days before
the meeting. 198 Notice must also be provided to each identified PRP.199
Failure to receive any notice does not affect the liabilities imposed upon the
party.20° The executive director must also make available to all interested
parties all public records regarding the facility. 20
1
Section 361.185 allows all PRPs the opportunity to conduct a "remedial
investigation/feasibility study."' 20 2 The PRPs must make a good faith offer
to conduct such a study within ninety days of the notice being issued.
20 3 If
the good faith offer is received by TWC within that period, those PRPs have
an additional sixty days to negotiate an agreed administrative order from
TWC.204
To encourage PRPs to conduct such remedial investigation/feasibility
studies, section 361.185 further provides that costs for the commission to
oversee the study will not be charged to those parties who fund or perform
the study.20 5 Non-participating PRPs who are ultimately found liable or
who enter into an agreed order to remedy the facility may be charged up to
the full cost of the study.206
The legislature completely amended section 361.186, which now allows
the executive director to authorize removal actions at facilities eligible for
listing on the state registry.20 7 Owners or operators of eligible facilities must
provide written notice of any substantial change in their use of the facil-
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1990).
193. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.183(a) (Vernon 1990).
194. Id. § 361.184(a).
195. Id. § 361.184(b).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 361.184(c).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. § 361.184(d).
201. Id.
202. Id. § 361.185(a).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. § 361.185(c).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 361.186(a).
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ity.208 If it is determined that a change in use will expose the public or
environment to increased harm, the facility may not be changed. 2° 9 How-
ever, a request for a hearing may be made.2 10
Section 361.187 has also been entirely amended. It now specifies that after
completion of the remedial investigation/feasibility study, a remedial action
will be selected and a public hearing will be held to discuss the proposal and
identify additional PRPs.211 All records relating to the facility must be
made available to the public, including a summary of such records.212
The PRPs may make a good faith offer to participate in the remedial ac-
tion; such parties may negotiate an agreed administrative order.213 Costs for
the commission to oversee this remedial action will not be assessed against
the parties participating in the remedial action.214 If the director determines
that a release is divisible, a party may conduct a partial removal at a portion
of the facility.215
Amended section 361.188 requires TWC, after consideration of all offers,
to issue a final administrative order meeting eight requirements. 21 6 If an
additional PRP is later identified, an amendment or a separate order may be
negotiated. 217 Likewise, amended section 361.190 now states that a facility
listed on the registry may not change the manner in which it is used without
notifying the executive director and receiving approval. 218
Section 361.191 now provides that TWC may immediately undertake a
removal action if the situation is so critical that a delay resulting from an
issuance of an administrative order would cause irreparable damage to the
public or the environment.2 19 After alleviating the danger, TWC must pro-
ceed with the issuance of an order.220 The expenses incurred as a result of
the immediate removal action shall be recoverable from the identified
pRPs.221
Section 361.192 now specifies that persons failing to heed an order by
TWC to eliminate an existing or impending danger within the stated time
period will be responsible for the cost incurred by TWC in implementing a
remedial action program. 222
Amended section 361.193 states the goal of remedial action: to eliminate
substantial endangerment to the public and the environment by utilizing the
lowest cost, technologically reliable alternative that effectively minimizes
208. Id. § 361.186(b).
209. Id. § 361.186(c).
210. Id.
211. Id. § 361.187(a), (c).
212. Id. § 361.187(b).
213. Id. § 361.187(d).
214. Id. § 361.187(e).
215. Id. § 361.187(f).
216. Id. § 361.188(a)(1)-(8).
217. Id. § 361.188(c).
218. Id. § 361.190(a).
219. Id. § 361.191(a).
220. Id. § 361.191(b).
221. Id. § 361.191(d).
222. Id. § 361.192(a)-(b).
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damage and affords protection to the public and the environment.22 3
Section 361.194 provides that remediation costs will constitute a lien on
the real property affected in favor of the state.224 The lien continues until
either the liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable. 225 The lien may be
foreclosed only by a court judgment.226
A section 361.194 lien is not enforceable if an encumbrance on or against
the property is acquired before the affidavit for the lien imposed by this sec-
tion was filed unless the person acquiring such property had, or reasonably
should have had, notice or knowledge that the property was subject to reme-
dial action.227 The owner of the property against which the lien is fixed may
file a bond to indemnify himself against the lien. 228
Amended section 361.195 provides that costs accrued by the TWC in con-
nection with the elimination of imminent damages including costs for in-
spection, sampling analysis, and identification of PRPs will be the
responsibility of identified PRPs before expenditure of state or federal
funds.229
Section 361.196 instructs PRPs to coordinate with federal and state haz-
ardous waste programs even though a state or local permit may not be re-
quired for removal or remedial actions.230 One who assists in a remedial
action plan is not liable for additional remediation costs resulting from his or
her non-negligent acts or omissions. 231
Section 361.197 now states that the TWC will file an action to recover
costs against all PRPs who do not comply with the terms of an administra-
tive order.232 Moreover, a PRP who does not comply with the terms of an
administrative order is subject to administrative or civil penalties under sec-
tion 361.198.233
15. Section 361.227: Venue
This section was amended to allow suits brought under this chapter and
involving unpermitted municipal solid waste facilities to be brought in
Travis County.234
16. Section 361.230: Fees and Costs Recoverable
Section 361.230 provides that the prevailing party may recover its reason-
able attorneys fees, court costs, and reasonable investigative costs when the
Attorney General or local government institutes a suit for injunctive relief or
223. Id. § 361.193(a).
224. Id. § 361.194(a).
225. Id. § 361.194(b).
226. Id. § 361.194(f).
227. Id. § 361.194(g).
228. Id. § 361.194(h).
229. Id. § 361.195(a)-(b).
230. Id. § 361.196(a).
231. Id. § 361.196(d).
232. Id. § 361.197(a).
233. Id. § 361.198(a).
234. Id. § 361.227(3).
[Vol. 45
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
to recover a civil penalty.23" The amount recovered, however, may not ex-
ceed $250,000.236
17. Section 361.322: Appeal of Administrative Order Issued Under
Section 361.372; Joinder of Parties
The new amendments to section 361.322 are organized as follows: subsec-
tion (c) provides that, in order to appeal an administrative order, it is not
necessary to fie a motion for rehearing under APTRA;237 subsection (e)
provides that the filing of a petition does not prevent the state agency from
proceeding with remedial action;238 and subsection (h) provides that the
standard of review for a court addressing the appropriateness of selected
remedial action is whether said action is "arbitrary or unreasonable."' 2 9
18. Section 361.341: Cost Recovery by State
Amended section 361.341 includes subsection (c), which provides that all
costs recovered by the state under subchapter F will be given to TWC and
deposited in the hazardous waste disposal fee fund.2 4 The section further
provides that costs recovered by the state under sections 361.271 through
361.277 are to be given to TWC and deposited in the hazardous waste gener-
ation and facility fees fund.241 Subsection (d) has been added to provide that
if the court finds that an appeal or third party claim is frivolous, the court
may assess damages against the party in an amount up to twice the cost
incurred by the state or the third party defendant.242
19. Sections 361.401-.405: Subchapter M Removal and Remedial Action
Agreements
Under the newly created subchapter M, five sections allocate the contrac-
tual responsibilities and liabilities between the Commission, the federal gov-
ernment, and engineers or contractors. 243 The new sections are as follows:
section 361.401 sets out definitions; section 361.402 lists commission duties
and powers; section 361.403 outlines terms and conditions of agreements
and costs; section 361.404 explains cooperations with the federal govern-
ment; and section 361.405 delinates the indemnification of engineers or
contractors.2 "
235. Id. § 361.230.
236. Id.
237. Id. § 361.322(c).
238. Id. § 361.322(e).
239. Id. § 361.322(h).
240. Id. § 361.341(c).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 361.341(d).




B. Comprehensive Municipal Solid Waste Management, Resource
Recovery, and Conservation Act
L Section 363.0615: Responsibility for Regional Planning
Section 363.0615 organizes the planning and subplanning regional coun-
cils, which provide for solid waste management plans of the region's local
government. 245 Section 363.0635 provides a time schedule for each planning
region in existence on September 1, 1989 to develop a regional solid waste
management plan, and for each local government within those regions to
develop local plans.2 "
2 Section 363.064: Contents of Regional or Local Solid Waste
Management Plan
Section 363.064 now includes three new sections encouraging cooperative
efforts between local governments for transporting waste between municipal-
ites and locating suitable landfills.247
245. Id. § 363.0615(a)-(d).
246. Id. § 363.0635(a)-(d).
247. Id. § 363.064(4)-(6).
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